Pintea v Johns: 18 Months Later by Macfarlane, Julie & Scarrow, Kaila
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
Law Publications Faculty of Law
10-2018
Pintea v Johns: 18 Months Later
Julie Macfarlane
University of Windsor, Faculty of Law
Kaila Scarrow
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub
Part of the Law Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Recommended Citation





The	  National	  Self-­‐‑Represented	  Litigants	  Project	  
	  
 
Pintea	  v	  Johns:	  	  






The	  Self-­‐‑Represented	  Litigants	  Case	  Law	  Database	  
Occasional	  Research	  Series,	  (Paper	  5)	  
October	  2018	  
	  
Kaila	  Scarrow	  &	  Julie	  Macfarlane	  	  








	  Table	  of	  Contents	  	  	  A.   Introduction	  ………………………………………………………………………………….……	  1	  	  B.   Cases	  That	  Applied	  Pintea	  To	  Assist	  SRLs	  ……………………………………………..	  2	  	  C.   Limitations	  on	  Pintea…………………………………………………………………………...	  5	  





   1  
A.   Introduction	  
	  It	  has	  been	  18	  months	  since	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada’s	  decision	  in	  Pintea	  v	  
Johns.1	   	   NSRLP’s	   SRL	   Case	   Law	   Database	   project	   is	   tracking	   the	   emerging	  jurisprudence	   on	   issues	   relating	   to	   the	   treatment	   and	   management	   of	   self-­‐‑represented	  litigants	  by	  the	  courts,	  and	  we	  regard	  the	  impact	  of	  Pintea	  since	  that	  decision	  came	  down	  to	  be	  an	  important	  topic	  to	  address	  in	  our	  ongoing	  series	  of	  detailed	  reports.	  Specifically,	  we	  wanted	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  courts	  have	  been	  applying	  this	  landmark	  decision	  for	  self-­‐‑represented	  litigants	  since	  April	  2017.	  	  In	   Pintea	   v	   Johns,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada	   endorses	   the	   Principles	  established	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Judicial	  Council	  (CJC)	  regarding	  self-­‐‑represented	  litigants	   (Statement	   of	   Principles	   on	   Self-­‐‑Represented	   Litigants	   and	   Accused	  
Persons,	  henceforth	  the	  CJC	  Principles).2	  These	  Principles	  outline	  the	  obligations	  and	   responsibilities	   owed	   by	   judges	   to	   SRLs	   and	   the	   obligations	   and	  responsibilities	   of	   SRLs	   when	   they	   participate	   in	   the	   court	   process.	   The	  
Principles	   acknowledge	   the	   disadvantage	   SRLs	   are	   at	   in	   navigating	   the	  complexities	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  on	  their	  own	  and	  often	  facing	  counsel	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  and	  exhort	  judges	  to	  take	  this	  into	  consideration	  in	  managing	  cases	  and	  rendering	  decisions.	  Specifically,	  Pintea	   addressed	   the	  application	  of	   the	  law	  of	  contempt	  to	  an	  SRL	  and	  held	  that	  the	  individual	   in	  question,	  who	  was	  self-­‐‑represented,	  could	  not	  be	  held	  in	  contempt	  of	  an	  order	  if	  he	  was	  not	  made	  aware	  of	  that	  order.3	  	  	  As	  of	  October	  2018,	  38	  cases	  reported	  in	  our	  source	  database	  (Westlaw)	  have	  referenced	  the	  Pintea	  decision	  in	  some	  way.	  We	  took	  a	  look	  at	  how	  these	  cases	  were	   decided,	   and	   how	   they	   applied	   or	   distinguished	   Pintea	   and	   the	   CJC	  
Principles.	  	   	  
                                                                                                                
1  Pintea	  v	  Johns,	  2017	  SCC	  23	  [Pintea].  2	  Statement	  of	  Principles	  on	  Self-­‐‑represented	  Litigants	  and	  Accused	  Persons,	  Canadian	  Judicial	  Council,	  September	  2006,	  https://www.cjc-­‐‑ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_other_PrinciplesStatement_2006_en.pdf.	  3	  Pintea	  at	  para	  1.	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B.  Cases	  That	  Applied	  Pintea	  to	  Assist	  SRLs	  
	  There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  reported	  cases	  over	  the	  past	  18	  months	  that	  have	  applied	  the	  Pintea	  decision	  to	  decisions	  involving	  SRLs,	  and	  attempted	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CJC	  Principles.	  
	  In	   PohQuong	   v	   Marks,	   an	   Ontario	   Court	   of	   Justice	   decision,	   the	   Court	   was	  “mindful	   of	   [its]	   duty	   to	   deal	  with	   cases	   justly	   [.	   .	   .]	   under	   the	   Statement	   of	  
Principles	  on	  Self-­‐‑Represented	  Litigants	  and	  Accused	  Persons.”4	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Court	  allowed	  the	  SRL	  to	  call	  additional	  evidence	  as	  he	  had	  requested,	  holding	  that	   the	   Principles	   require	   that	   judges	   not	   deny	   relief	   based	   on	   an	   easily	  rectified	  deficiency.5	  	  	  Other	  Ontario	  decisions	  have	  reflected	  similar	  support	  for	  the	  Principles.	  In	  R	  v	  
Tossounian,	  a	  criminal	  case,	  the	  Ontario	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  found	  that	  “the	  trial	  judge	  in	  this	  case	  failed	  to	  carry	  out	  these	  duties	  to	  the	  unrepresented	  accused”6	  and	   ordered	   a	   new	   trial.	   The	   Court	   also	   discussed	   the	   responsibility	   the	  
Principles	  impose	  on	  judges	  in	  respect	  of	  self-­‐‑represented	  litigants7	  and	  stated	  that:	  	  	  	   “Judges	   have	   a	   responsibility	   to	   inquire	   whether	   self-­‐‑represented	  persons	   are	   aware	   of	   their	   procedural	   options,	   and	   to	   direct	   them	   to	  available	   information	   if	   they	   are	   not.	  Depending	   on	   the	   circumstances	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  case,	   judges	  may	  explain	  the	  relevant	   law	  in	  the	  case	  and	   its	   implications,	   before	   the	   self-­‐‑represented	   person	  makes	   critical	  choices.”8	  	  	  More	  recently,	  in	  an	  important	  clarification	  of	  applications	  for	  appeal	  that	  rely	  	  on	  Pintea	  and	  the	  CJC	  Principles,	  the	  Newfoundland	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  in	  Cabana	  
v	   Newfoundland	   and	   Labrador,	   noted	   that	   simply	   asserting	   a	   breach	   of	   the	  
Principles	  is	  not	  sufficient	  grounds	  to	  appeal;	  the	  appellant	  must	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  failure	  to	  consider	  or	  apply	  the	  Principles	  affected	  their	  access	  to	  equal	  justice.9	  The	  Cabana	  decision	  also	  highlighted	  the	  relevance	  and	  importance	  of	  
                                                                                                                4	  PohQuong	  v	  Marks,	  2017	  ONCJ	  706	  at	  para	  28.  5	  Ibid	  at	  para	  29.	  	  6	  R	  v	  Tossounian,	  2017	  ONCA	  618	  at	  para	  39.	  7	  Ibid	  at	  para	  37.	  	  8	  Ibid	  at	  para	  38	  (citing	  the	  Principles).	  	  9	  Cabana	  v	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador,	  2018	  NLCA	  52	  at	  para	  62	  [Cabana].  
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the	  Principles	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  they	  inform	  the	  notions	  of	  trial	  fairness	  and	  exercise	  of	  procedural	  discretion.10	  	  	  In	  Henderson	   v	  Winsa,	   the	  Ontario	  Court	  of	   Justice	   recognized	   its	  duties	   and	  obligations	   towards	   SRLs	   “…	   to	   explain	   the	   relevant	   law	   and	   its	   procedural	  implications,	  remaining	  sensitive	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  [other	  party].”11	  In	  its	  decision,	  the	  Court	  explained	  that	  it	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  that	  in	  making	  “critical	  choices”,	  the	  SRL	  understood	  the	  relevant	  law	  and	  procedure,	  citing	  to	  specific	  cases	  when	  dealing	  with	  each	  issue,	  in	  order	  that	  she	  could	  make	  an	  informed	  decision.12	  	  	  Two	   Ontario	   cases	   involving	   Children’s	   Aid	   Societies	   and	   self-­‐‑represented	  parents	  have	  used	  Pintea	  to	  establish	  limits	  to	  the	  use	  of	  summary	  judgment.	  In	  
Children’s	  Aid	  Society	  of	  Toronto	  v	  EB,	  the	  Court	  dismissed	  the	  society’s	  motion	  for	   summary	   judgment	   and	   based	   this	   decision	   partly	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  mother	  was	  self-­‐‑represented;	  “the	  stakes	  for	  her	  are	  very	  high	  and	  granting	  the	  motion	  will	  deprive	  her	  of	  the	  procedural	  safeguards	  of	  a	  trial.”13	  	  	  
Catholic	  Children’s	  Aid	  Society	  Toronto	  v	  CG14	  went	  further,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Society	  sought	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  self-­‐‑represented	  mother	  by	  attempting	  to	  admit	  evidence	  they	  knew	  would	  not	  meet	  the	  evidentiary	  standard	  required	  on	  a	  motion	  for	  summary	  judgment.	  The	  Ontario	  Court	  of	  Justice	  protected	  the	  mother’s	   legal	   interests	   by	   challenging	   the	   Society’s	   conduct	   and	   dismissing	  their	  motion,	   holding	   that	   “it	   was	   not	   realistic	   for	   the	  mother	   to	   be	   able	   to	  meaningfully	  respond	  to	  the	  volume	  of	  inadmissible	  evidence	  presented	  to	  her	  by	   the	   society	   and	   it	   was	   unfair	   of	   the	   society	   to	   place	   the	   mother	   in	   that	  position.”15	  Justice	  Sherr	  continued	  that	  because	  of	  the	  practical	  difficulty	  and	  complexity	   of	   a	   SRL	   challenging	   inadmissible	   evidence,	   “the	   Society	   should	  have	  been	  even	  more	  vigilant	  in	  ensuring	  that	  its	  evidence	  was	  presented	  in	  a	  proper	  form.”16	  The	  Court	  cites	  Pintea	  v	  Johns	  and	  notes	  the	  following	  from	  the	  
Principles	  in	  their	  decision:	  	  
	  
                                                                                                                10	  Ibid	  at	  para	  59.	  11	  Henderson	  v	  Winsa,	  2018	  ONSC	  3378	  at	  para	  21.	  12	  Ibid	  at	  para	  24.	  13	  Children’s	  Aid	  Society	  of	  Toronto	  v	  EB,	  2018	  ONCJ	  333	  at	  para	  58.	  
14	  Catholic	  Children’s	  Aid	  Society	  of	  Toronto	  v	  CG,	  2018	  ONCJ	  193	  at	  para	  34.	  15	  Ibid	  at	  para	  17.	  16	  Ibid	  at	  para	  28.  
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a.   “Access	  to	  justice	  for	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons	  requires	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  court	   process	   to	   be,	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   open,	   transparent,	   clearly	  defined,	  simple,	  convenient	  and	  accommodating.	  b.   Judges	   and	   court	   administrators	   should	   do	   whatever	   is	   possible	   to	  provide	  a	  fair	  and	  impartial	  process	  and	  prevent	  an	  unfair	  disadvantage	  to	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons.	  c.   Judges	  should	  ensure	  that	  procedural	  and	  evidentiary	  rules	  are	  not	  used	  to	  unjustly	  hinder	  the	  legal	  interests	  of	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons.”17	  	  Courts	  in	  other	  provinces	  have	  also	  reinforced	  Pintea	  and	  the	  Principles	  in	  their	  decisions.	   In	   AAAM	   v	   Provincial	   Director	   of	   Adoption,	   a	   British	   Columbia	  Supreme	  Court	  case,	  an	  SRL	  sought	  adjournment	  of	  a	   trial	   scheduled	   to	   take	  place	  four	  days	  following	  that	  hearing.	  Although	  the	  Court	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  was	  some	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  the	  SRL	  had	  previously	  sought	  to	  delay	  this	  matter,	   the	  adjournment	  was	  granted	  (with	  some	  conditions),	  because	  of	  his	  status	  as	  a	  self-­‐‑represented	   litigant	  operating	   in	  a	  second	   language	  and	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada’s	  guidance	  in	  Pintea.18	  Similarly,	  the	  Alberta	   Court	   of	   Queen’s	   Bench	   in	   Alberta	   Lawyers	   Insurance	   Association	   v	  
Bourque	  agreed	  to	  an	  adjournment	  in	  light	  of	  the	  SRL’s	  inability	  to	  attend	  the	  hearing	  and,	  citing	  to	  Pintea,	  “being	  mindful	  of	  the	  Court’s	  obligations	  to	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons”.19	  	  	  	  
Young	   v	   Noble,20	   a	   Newfoundland	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   case,	   reflects	   a	   similar	  rationale.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   Court	   noted	   that	   it	   had	   “a	   duty	   to	   ensure	   that	  everyone	   is	   treated	   fairly	   and	   without	   discrimination.”21	   Justice	   White	  continued:	   “It	   is	   impossible	   to	   deny	   that	   there	   is	   an	   inequality	  when	   a	   self-­‐‑represented	  litigant	  must	  argue	  a	  case	  against	  experienced	  counsel”	  and	  that	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Principles	  endorsed	  in	  Pintea	  “the	  Court	  must	  take	  affirmative	  and	  non-­‐‑prejudicial	  steps	  to	  address	  this.”22	  	  
                                                                                                                17	  Ibid	  at	  para	  15.	  18	  AAAM	  v	  Provincial	  Director	  of	  Adoption,	  2017	  BCSC	  1878	  at	  para	  20.	  	  19	  Alberta	  Lawyers	  Insurance	  Association	  v	  Bourque,	  2018	  ABQB	  311	  at	  para	  6.	  
20  Young	  v	  Noble,	  2017	  NLCA	  48.  21	  Ibid	  at	  para	  34.	  	  22	  Ibid	  at	  para	  34.   
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An	  interesting	  decision	  by	  the	  Alberta	  Court	  of	  Queen’s	  Bench	  refusing	  a	  desk	  divorce	  determined	  that	  the	  Principles	  endorsed	  in	  Pintea	  impose	  obligations	  on	  the	  Court	  that	  are	  not	  relieved	  “merely	  because	  the	  Order	  is	  by	  consent.”23	  	  These	  cases	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Principles	  and	  the	  obligations	  they	  impose	  on	  courts	  to	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  disadvantages	  inherent	  in	  the	  position	  of	  an	  SRL.	  	  
	  
C.   Limitations	  on	  Pintea	  
	  Aside	  from	  cases	  which	  factually	  distinguish	  Pintea,	  we	  have	  noted	  two	  strands	  of	   judicial	  reasoning	  that	  suggest	   limitations	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Pintea	  and	  the	  Principles.	  
	  
(i)   Judicial	  assistance	  under	  Pintea	  may	  be	  “forfeit”	  for	  previous	  
bad	  behaviour	  
	  While	  the	  Principles	  present	  the	  court	  with	  duties	  and	  responsibilities,	  they	  also	  set	  expectations	   for	  SRLs.	   In	   the	   following	  cases,	   there	   is	  a	  suggestion	   that	  a	  court	  is	  not	  responsible	  to	  apply	  the	  Principles	  when	  a	  SRL	  has	  failed	  to	  keep	  their	  side	  of	  this	  “bargain”.	  	  	  In	   Re	   Thompson24	   and	   Thompson	   v	   Alberta	   Labour	   Relations	   Board25,	   two	  Alberta	   Court	   of	   Queen’s	   Bench	   cases	   involving	   the	   same	   SRL	   and	   the	   same	  judge,	   the	   SRL	   had	   previously	   been	   designated	   a	   vexatious	   litigant	   and	  was	  subject	  to	  court	  access	  restrictions.	  	  	  In	  Re	  Thompson,	  the	  court	  denied	  the	  SRL’s	  application	  because	  the	  SRL	  failed	  to	   file	   the	   affidavit	   he	   intended	   to	   rely	   upon	   and	   the	   decision	   he	  wished	   to	  challenge.	   The	   Court	   acknowledged	   the	   Principles	   endorsed	   in	   Pintea,	  “recogniz[ing]	   that	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons	  have	  special	  characteristics	   that	  must	   be	   considered	   by	   judges,	   so	   as	   to	   properly	   reflect	   and	   appreciate	   the	  challenges	  faces	  by	  persons	  without	  lawyers	  who	  are	  confronted	  by	  a	  complex	  legal	  apparatus.”26	  The	  Court	  then	  went	  on	  to	  emphasize	  that	  “the	  Statement	  [of	  
                                                                                                                23	  Orga	  v	  Smith,	  2018	  ABQB	  101	  at	  para	  8.	  	  
24  Re	  Thompson,	  2018	  ABQB	  87	  [Re	  Thompson].  
25  Thompson	  v	  Alberta	  Labour	  Relations	  Board,	  2018	  ABQB	  220	  [Thompson].  26	  Re	  Thompson	  at	  para	  23.	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Principles]	  is	  not	  a	  unilateral	  document”27	  and	  that	  SRLs	  also	  have	  obligations:	  “they	  are	  expected	  to	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  the	  relevant	  legal	  practices	  and	  procedures	  pertaining	  to	  their	  case;	  expected	  to	  prepare	  their	  own	  case;	  and	  are	  required	  to	  be	  respectful	  of	  the	  court	  process	  and	  the	  officials	  within	  it	  –	  vexatious	  litigants	  will	  not	  be	  permitted	  to	  abuse	  the	  process.”28	  The	  Court	  noted	  that	  the	  omission	  in	  this	  case	  would	  not	  be	  fatal	  to	  some	  SRL	  applications,	  but	  that	  here,	  they	  understood	  the	  SRL	  to	  be	  experienced	  and	  thus	  familiar	  with	  the	  documentary	  and	  procedural	  requirements.29	  	  	  In	  Thompson	  v	  Alberta	  Labor	  Relations	  Board,	  the	  same	  SRL	  was	  again	  denied	  leave	   to	   file	   an	   application	   because	   of	   omissions	   in	   his	   application.	   The	   SRL	  refers	  to	  the	  Pintea	  decision	  and	  the	  Principles	  in	  his	  materials,	  but	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  SRL	  was	  previously	  designated	  a	  vexatious	  litigant,	  curtailing	  further	  discussion	  on	  Pintea	  and	  the	  Principles.	  	  	  A	  similar	  concern	  that	  any	  history	  of	  litigation	  “abuse”	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  the	   application	   of	   the	  Principles	   is	   set	   out	   in	   1985	   Sawridge	   Trust	   v	   Alberta	  
(Public	   Trustee),30	   	   a	   Alberta	   Court	   of	   Queen’s	   Bench	   decision	   on	   costs.	   The	  Court	   first	  noted	   that	   the	   effect	   of	  Pintea	  was	   “a substantial	   rejection	  by	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  of	  the	  traditional	  approach,	  that	  rules	  of	  procedure	  and	   evidence	   apply	   the	   same	   to	   everyone	   who	   appears	   before	   a	   Canadian	  court.”31. The	  Principles	  were	  described	  as	   illustrative	  of	  “how	  the	  traditional	  formal	  rules	  of	  procedure	  and	  evidence	  bend	  to	  the	  new	  reality	  faced	  by	  trial	  courts,	  and	  what	  is	  required	  to	  provide	  a	  fair	  and	  just	  result	  for	  self-­‐‑represented	  litigants”,	   given	   the	   complexities	   faced	   by	   SRLs	   dealing	   with	   a	   legal	   system	  “whose	  workings	  are	  at	  times	  both	  arcane	  and	  unwritten”.	  However	  the	  Court	  then	   goes	   on	   to	   note	   that	   ensuring	   a	   “fair	   and	   just	   result”	   also	   requires	  recognition	  that	  “the	  Principles	  [are]	  not	  a	  licence	  for	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons	  to	  engage	  the	  courts	  as	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  rules.”32	  and	  that	  “abusive	  litigation	  is	  not	  excused	  because	  someone	  is	  self-­‐‑represented.”33	  	  
                                                                                                                27	  Ibid	  at	  para	  24.	  	  28	  Ibid.	  
29  Ibid	  at	  para	  14.	    
30  1985	  Sawridge	  Trust	  v	  Alberta	  (Public	  Trustee)	  2017	  ABQB	  530.  
31  Ibid	  at	  para	  45.  
32  Ibid	  at	  paras	  46.  
33  Ibid	  at	  para	  47.  
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In	  Gray	  v	  Gray,34	  an	  Ontario	  Superior	  Court	  found	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  SRL	  seeking	  to	  set	  aside	  a	  previous	  decision,	  but	  consistent	  with	  Sawridge	  and	  the	  Thompson	  cases	  noted	  that	  in	  applying	  the	  Principles	  the	  history	  of	  an	  SRL’s	  conduct	  is	  a	  relevant	  consideration.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  SRL	  had	  failed	  to	  appear	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  trial.	  The	  Court	  noted	  that	  the	  SRL	  here	  had	  historically	  “…participated	  in	  the	  proceeding	  for	  the	  most	  part	  appropriately	  and,	  importantly,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Trial	   Management	   Conference,	   he	   had	   satisfied	   his	   disclosure	   obligations”	  pursuant	   to	   a	   previous	   endorsement	   of	   the	   court35	   and	   that	   he	   had	   “moved	  expeditiously	   to	  address	   the	  default	  order	  by	  commencing	  an	  appeal	   and	  by	  bringing	  this	  motion.”36	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  SRL’s	  failure	  to	  appear	  should	  not	  be	  held	  against	  him	  because	  he	  had	  received	  poor	  advice	  from	  a	  paralegal	  and	  made	  a	  bad	  decision	  to	  attend	  work	  rather	  than	  appear.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  Court	  set	  aside	  the	  earlier	  decision.37	  	  	  	  These	  cases	  indicate	  that	   in	  some	  courts	  the	  Principles	  will	  not	  be	  applied	  to	  enable	  judicial	  assistance	  to	  a	  SRL	  if	  the	  judge	  feels	  that	  the	  SRL	  has	  not	  behaved	  appropriately	   during	   the	   litigation,	   or	   cannot	   justify	   earlier	   behaviour	   and	  choices.	  This	  may	  be	  reflected	  in	  earlier	  designations	  as	  a	  vexatious	  litigant,	  or	  earlier	  decisions	  that	  have	  rebuked	  the	  SRL	  for	  abuse	  of	  process.	  	  	  While	   these	   cases	   explain	   their	   reasoning	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   ensure	   a	   balance	  between	  both	  the	  rights	  and	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  SRLs,	  the	  direction	  of	  these	  cases	   concerns	   us.	   The	   reason	   is	   the	   wide	   variation	   anf	   constantly	   shifting	  terrain	  in	  judicial	  practice	  in	  both	  formally	  designating	  SRLs	  as	  vexatious,	  and	  informally	   describing	   them	   as	   such	   in	   decisions.38	   Furthermore,	   while	   the	  
Principles	   are	   clear	   that	   no	   litigant	   should	   be	   permitted	   to	   abuse	   the	   court	  process,	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  either	  Pintea	  or	  the	  Principles	  to	  suggests	  that	  a	  SRL	  should	   be	   denied	  minimal	   judicial	   assistance	   -­‐‑	   described	   in	   both	   sources	   as	  essential	   to	   ensure	   their	   meaningful	   participation	   -­‐‑	   if	   they	   have	   previously	  “abused”	  the	  court	  process,	  or	  have	  been	  designated	  a	  vexatious	  litigant.	  	  	  	  	  
                                                                                                                
34  Gray	  v	  Gray,	  2017	  ONSC	  5028.  35	  Ibid	  at	  para	  63.	  36	  Ibid	  at	  para	  63.	  37	  Ibid	  at	  para	  69.  
38  See	  Introducing	  the	  SRL	  Case	  Law	  Database	  pp7-­‐‑10	  at	  https://representingyourselfcanada.com/introducing-­‐‑the-­‐‑self-­‐‑represented-­‐‑litigant-­‐‑case-­‐‑law-­‐‑database/and	  our	  more	  detailed	  forthcoming	  report,	  The	  Vexatious	  Litigant.  
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(ii)   Judicial	  assistance	  may	  be	  withheld	  from	  “sophisticated”	  SRLs	  
	  Another	   group	   of	   cases	   indicate	   that	   SRLs	   who	   appear	   to	   be	   intelligent,	  experienced,	   and	   generally	  more	   “sophisticated”	   should	   receive	   less	   judicial	  assistance.	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  suggestion	  of	  this	  in	  some	  of	  the	  cases	  already	  described	  (for	  example	  
R	  v	  Thompson,	   above39),	  but	   the	   idea	   is	  made	  explicit	   in	  Clark	  v	  Pezzente,	   an	  Alberta	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  case.40	  The	  SRL	  appellant	  argued	  that	  he	  should	  not	  be	  denied	  the	  ability	  to	  appeal	  because	  of	  his	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  procedural	  rule	  governing	  appeals,	  and	  cited	  to	  the	  Principles.41	  The	  Court	  instead	  found	  that	   the	   SRL	   was	   sophisticated,	   articulate,	   well-­‐‑informed	   and	   capable	   of	  advancing	  his	  arguments	  –	  “not	  a	  neophyte	  in	  the	  civil	   justice	  system.”42	  The	  Court	  continued	  that	  under	  the	  Principles,	  “self-­‐‑represented	  litigants	  also	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  the	  relevant	  legal	  practices	  and	  procedures	  pertaining	  to	  their	  case	  and	  make	  reasonable	  efforts	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Rules	  of	  Court,	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  their	  abilities.”43	  	  
CJD	  v	  RIJ,	  an	  Alberta	  Queen’s	  Bench	  case,	  followed	  Pintea	  in	  finding	  that	  a	  SRL	  could	  not	  be	  found	  in	  contempt	  for	  failing	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  court	  order	  when	  they	  had	  not	  received	  notice	  of	  the	  order.	  However,	  Graesser	  J.	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  
obiter	  comments	  that	  a	  burden	  is	  placed	  on	  judicial	  resources	  when	  SRLs	  “who	  are	   intelligent,	   who	   have	   familiarized	   themselves	   with	   court	   process”	   take	  advantage	   of	   the	   ease	   of	   filing	   applications	   and	   appeals.44	   Many	   of	   these	  litigants	  believe	  they	  “will	  always	  be	  able	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  their	  ‘disadvantaged’	  position	  as	  a	  self-­‐‑represented	  litigant,	  not	  learned	  in	  the	  law,	  and	  unfazed	  by	  cost	  awards	  either	  because	  cost	  awards	  are	  rarely	  made	  where	  both	  parties	  are	  self-­‐‑represented,	  or	  when	  costs	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  collected	  even	  if	  awarded.”45	  Justice	  Graesser	  continues	  that	  it	  “is	  an	  obvious	  frustration	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  be	  in	  situations	  where	  games	  are	  being	  played,46	  large	  amounts	  of	  valuable	  court	  time	   and	   resources	   are	   being	   consumed,	   and	   few	   effective	   remedies	   are	  granted.	   It	   is	   also	   frustrating	   for	   the	   litigants	   on	   the	   other	   side	   (and	   their	  
                                                                                                                
39  Re	  Thompson,	  2018	  ABQB	  87	  and	  see	  para	  14.  
40  Clark	  v	  Pezzente,	  2017	  ABCA	  220.  41	  Ibid	  at	  para	  12.	  42	  Ibid	  at	  para	  14.	  43	  Ibid	  at	  para	  19.  44	  Ibid	  at	  para	  51.	  45	  Ibid	  at	  para	  51.	  	  46	  Our	  italics.	  
   9  
lawyers)	  to	  see	  the	  system	  being	  abused	  in	  this	  fashion,	  and	  the	  court	  appearing	  toothless	   and	   powerless.”47	   Justice	   Graesser	   concludes	   that	   “’gaming	   the	  system’	   by	   intelligent	   and	   sophisticated	   SRLs	   may	   undermine	   access	   to	  justice.”48	  	  While	  these	  comments	  are	  obiter,	  they	  suggest	  skepticism	  about	  the	  principle	  that	   lies	  at	   the	  heart	  of	  Pintea;	   that	  SRLs	  need	   judicial	  assistance	   in	  order	   to	  understand	  the	  legal	  process	  and	  meaningfully	  participate.	  	  
	  
D.  Extending	  the	  Ruling	  	  
	  In	  Moore	  v	  Apollo	  Health	  Care,	  the	  Ontario	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  described	  in	  some	  detail	   how	   a	   judge	   should	  make	   the	   necessary	   enquiries	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  position	  being	  taken	  by	  a	  SRL	  is	  clear,	  and	  that	  a	  SRL	  understands	  the	  outcomes	  of	  their	  crucial	  choices.	  The	  Court	  in	  Apollo	  helpfully	  spells	  this	  out.	  It	  is	  critical	  that:	  	   “(i)	  the	  trial	  judge	  is	  left	  in	  no	  doubt	  about	  the	  party's	  position;	  (ii)	  the	  self-­‐‑represented	  person	  clearly	  understands	  the	  legal	  implications	  of	  the	  critical	  choice	  she	  faces	  about	  whether	  to	  pursue	  or	  abandon	  a	  claim;	  and	  (iii)	  the	  self-­‐‑represented	  person	  clearly	  understands	  from	  the	  trial	  judge	  which	  of	  her	  claims	  he	  will	  adjudicate.”49	  	  	  	  Justice	  Brown	  also	  observes	  that	  “while	  self-­‐‑represented	  persons	  vary	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  education	  and	  sophistication,	  I	  think	  it	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  most	  find	  court	  procedures	  complex,	  confusing	  and	  intimidating.”	  50	  	  	  This	   approach	   stands	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   cases	   described	   above	  where	   other	  courts	   have	   noted	   that	   a	   SRL	   well-­‐‑versed	   in	   the	   court	   process	   and	   who	   is	  intelligent	   and	   sophisticated	   does	   not	   require	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   court’s	  obligations	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  Principles.	  	  	  	  	  
                                                                                                                47	  Ibid	  at	  para	  52.	  
48  CJD	  v	  RIJ,	  2018	  ABQB	  287	  at	  para	  47,	  50-­‐‑51.  49	  Ibid	  at	  para	  47.    50	  Moore	  v	  Apollo	  Health	  &	  Beauty	  Care,	  2017	  ONCA	  383	  at	  para	  44.	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E.   Cases	  That	  Distinguish	  Pintea	  
	  A	  number	  of	  decisions	  have	  considered	  Pintea	  but	  have	  distinguished	  it	  on	  the	  facts.	  	  	  In	  Alberta	  Health	  Services	  v	  Wang,	  the	  Alberta	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  dismissed	  the	  SRL’s	  application	  to	  review	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  case	  management	  officer.	  The	  Court	  distinguished	  this	  case	  from	  Pintea	  by	  finding	  that	  the	  case	  management	  officer	  was	  available	  and	  willing	  to	  assist	  the	  applicants	  and	  that	  they	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  comply	  with	  and	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  the	  Rules.51	  	  	  Other	  cases	  have	  distinguished	  Pintea	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  holding	  on	  contempt.52	  For	  example,	  in	  Mayfield	  Television	  Production	  Ltd.	  v	  Stange,	  the	  Alberta	  Queen’s	  Bench	   found	   that	   the	   individual	   had	   personal	   knowledge	   of	   all	   the	   orders,	  unlike	   in	  Pintea,	   and	   therefore	   found	   the	  SRL	   in	   contempt.53	   Similarly,	   in	  Al-­‐‑
Ghamdi	  v	  Alberta,	  another	  Alberta	  Queen’s	  Bench	  decision,	  the	  SRL	  was	  found	  in	  contempt	  because	  the	  Court	  believed	  beyond	  a	  reasonable	  doubt	  that	  he	  was	  aware	  of	   the	  order	   and	   the	  order	  was	   clear	   in	   stating	  what	  was	   required	  of	  him.54	  The	  SRL	   in	   this	   case	   argued	   that	  he	  was	  not	   served	  with	   the	  order55;	  however	  the	  Court	  noted	  that	  since	  the	  SRL	  appeared	  ex	  parte	  before	  the	  judge	  who	  issued	  the	  order	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  been	  served	  with	  an	  Order,	  and	  that	  	  he	  was	  also	  advised	  by	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  court	  of	  how	  to	  obtain	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  order.56	  	  
	  
F.   Conclusions	  
	  The	  Pintea	  decision	  was	  intended	  to	  promote	  fair	  and	  equal	  access	  to	  justice.	  The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  endorsement	  of	  the	  CJC’s	  Principles	  recognizes	  that	  SRLs	  are	  at	  a	  significant	  disadvantage	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  when	  they	  are	  navigating	  what	   many	   judges	   have	   acknowledged	   to	   be	   a	   complex	   and	   archaic	   legal	  system.	  Moreover,	   the	   legal	   system	   contains	  many	   “arcane	   and	   unwritten”57	  conventions	  that	  are	  unknown	  and	  unknowable	  to	  SRLs.	  In	  effect,	  Pintea	  says	  
                                                                                                                51	  Alberta	  Health	  Services	  v	  Wang,	  2017	  ABCA	  	  60	  at	  para	  11.	  	  52	  Pintea	  v	  Johns,	  2017	  SCC	  23	  at	  para	  1.	  53	  Mayfield	  Television	  Production	  Ltd.	  v	  Stange,	  2018	  ABQB	  294	  at	  para	  54.	  54	  Al-­‐‑Ghamdi	  v	  Alberta,	  2017	  ABQB	  684	  at	  para	  456.	  	  
55  Ibid	  at	  para	  424,	  430.  56	  Ibid	  at	  para	  430.  
57  1985	  Sawridge	  Trust	  v	  Alberta	  (Public	  Trustee)	  2017	  ABQB	  530	  at	  para	  45.  
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that	   there	   is	   no	   “formal	   equality”	   between	   represented	   and	   represented	  litigants.	  
	  Tracking	  the	  subsequent	  jurisprudence	  across	  the	  country	  since	  the	  decision	  in	  
Pintea	  18	  months	  ago,	  we	  see	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  address	  how	  the	  courts	  discharge	   their	   obligations	   to	   ensure	   a	   fair	   outcome	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  
Principles.	  Clarifying	  decisions	  include	  Young	  v	  Noble,58	  and	  Catholic	  Children’s	  
Aid	   Society	  Toronto	   v	  CG.59	   In	   some	  cases,	  most	  notably	   the	  Ontario	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decision	   in	  Apollo,60	   the	  Court	  has	  usefully	  expanded	  on	   the	  practical	  application	  of	  Pintea,	  consistent	  with	  the	  Principles.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  also	  see	  a	  number	  of	  decisions	  that	  suggest	  that	  SRLs	  are	  exploiting	   their	   position	   as	   confused,	   uneducated	   and	   unaware	   of	   the	  complexities	  of	  the	  legal	  process	  to	  ‘game’	  or	  ‘abuse’	  the	  legal	  system,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Pintea	  decision.	  As	  we	  have	  suggested	  in	  previous	  reports,61	  it	  is	  often	  far	  from	   clear	   whether	   SRL	   behaviours	   that	   do	   not	   comply	   with	   the	   rules	   are	  deliberate	  and	  intentional,	  or	  if	  they	  are	  the	  natural	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  awareness	  or	  understanding	  of	  the	  process.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  some	  courts	  are	  adopting	  a	  default	  to	  assume	  “intentionality”,	  while	   others	   are	   more	   willing	   to	   see	   mistakes	   as	   inadvertent	   and	   the	  consequence	  of	  lack	  of	  knowledge.	  There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Principles	  have	  been	  deemed	  to	  be	  inapplicable	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  SRL	  has,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  court,	  behaved	  inappropriately	  or	  was	  assessed	  as	  a	  sophisticated	  and	   experienced	   litigant,	   implying	   that	   they	  ought	  not	   to	  have	  made	  mistakes	  or	  omissions.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  cases	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  creating	  “exceptions”	  to	  Pintea	  come	  from	  a	  single	  jurisdiction	  –	  Alberta.	  In	  fact,	  of	  the	  38	  cases	  total	  that	  have	  cited	  to	  the	  Pintea	  decision,	  just	  over	  50%	  are	  from	  Alberta.	  We	  can	  only	  speculate	  that	  this	  may	  be	  because	  Pintea	  originated	  in	  the	  Alberta	  courts.	  	  
                                                                                                                
58  Young	  v	  Noble,	  2017	  NLCA	  48.  
59	  Catholic	  Children’s	  Aid	  Society	  of	  Toronto	  v	  CG,	  2018	  ONCJ	  193	  at	  para	  34.	  
60  Moore	  v	  Apollo	  Health	  &	  Beauty	  Care,	  2017	  ONCA	  383.  
61	  See  Introducing	  the	  SRL	  Case	  Law	  Database	  pp7-­‐‑10	  at	  https://representingyourselfcanada.com/introducing-­‐‑the-­‐‑self-­‐‑represented-­‐‑litigant-­‐‑case-­‐‑law-­‐‑database/	  Substantial	  and	  Punitive	  Costs	  Awards	  Against	  Self-­‐‑Represented	  Litigantss,	  Ashley	  Haines	  and	  Julie	  Macfarlane,	  July	  2018,	  https://representingyourselfcanada.com/costs-­‐‑awards-­‐‑against-­‐‑srls	  and	  our	  more	  detailed	  forthcoming	  report,	  The	  Vexatious	  Litigant.  
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Neither	  Pintea	  nor	  the	  Principles	  address	  a	  trade-­‐‑off	  of	  obligations,	  with	  an	  SRL	  who	  is	  considered	  not	  to	  have	  lived	  up	  to	  their	  responsibilities	  forfeiting	  a	  right	  to	  minimal	   judicial	   assistance.	  Whatever	   the	   past	   history	   of	   the	   SRL,	   Pintea	  stands	  for	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  court	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  fair	  and	  equal	  access	   to	   justice	   even	   where	   this	   means	   treating	   a	   self-­‐‑represented	   litigant	  differently	   than	   a	   represented	   litigant.	   Where	   there	   are	   easily	   rectifiable	  deficiencies	  in	  cases	  SRLs	  should	  be	  afforded	  judicial	  assistance	  and	  should	  not	  be	  denied	  relief.	  	  	  Also	  noteworthy	  is	  the	  recent	  decision	  of	  the	  Newfoundland	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  that	  there	  is	  no	  an	  automatic	  right	  to	  appeal	  a	  decision	  for	  a	  court’s	  failure	  to	  consider	  or	  apply	  the	  Principles.	  The	  appellant	  SRL	  must	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  their	  access	  to	  fair	  justice	  was	  impeded,	  for	  example	  whether	  that	  failure	  to	  apply	  the	  Principles	  affected	  trial	  fairness	  or	  resulted	  in	  the	  unfair	  or	  unequal	  treatment	  of	  the	  SRL.62	  	  We	  shall	   continue	   to	   track	   the	  emerging	   jurisprudence	   following	  Pintea,	   and	  especially	  any	  ongoing	  regional	  variations	  in	  its	  application.	  	  	  
                                                                                                                
62  Cabana	  at	  para	  62.	    
